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Abstract—The evaluation of algorithms and techniques to im-
plement intrusion detection systems heavily rely on the existence
of well designed datasets. In the last years, a lot of efforts
have been done towards building these datasets. Yet, there is
still room to improve. In this paper, a comprehensive review of
existing datasets is first done, making emphasis on their main
shortcomings. Then, we present a new dataset that is built with
real traffic and up-to-date attacks. The main advantage of this
dataset over previous ones is its usefulness for evaluating IDSs
that consider long-term evolution and traffic periodicity. Models
that consider differences in daytime/night or weekdays/weekends
can also be trained and evaluated with it. We discuss all the
requirements for a modern IDS evaluation dataset and analyze
how the one presented here meets the different needs.
Index Terms—Network Security, Dataset, IDS, Network Traf-
fic, Netflow
I. INTRODUCTION
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) appeared in the security
arena as a solution for the problem of identifying malicious
activities in networks and systems. In few words, an IDS
consists of a monitoring module in charge of obtaining data, a
preprocessing module to adapt these data to further processing
steps in the system, and a decision module able to determine
if an event might be considered malicious or not.
There are several types of IDSs [1]: Network-based IDSs
(NIDS) monitor network events like flows or firewall logs,
among others, while host-based IDSs (HIDS) consider system-
related events, e.g. syslog, file system watchdog, CPU load,
etc. IDSs are also classified according to their detection
approach. This way, signature-based IDSs (S-IDS) rely on
rules to decide if an observed behavior is malicious or not,
while anomaly-based IDSs (A-IDS) [2] build a model from
training data and consider that any behavior that deviates
from this model is anomalous. Note that, although there is
a semantic difference between an anomalous behavior and a
malicious one, A-IDSs normally consider them equivalently.
A main problem for testing the capabilities of IDSs is
the need of a representative standard dataset that allows the
comparison among different proposals. In the 90s, DARPA
funded a project to build such a dataset and MIT Lincoln
Lab produced the well known DARPA’98 and DARPA’99
datasets [3]. After being thoroughly used and studied by
several authors, some limitations were pointed out, such as
the existence of duplicated records, non-balanced samples of
attack and normal connections, and the inherent limitations
to considering synthetic traffic. Since then, many other re-
searchers and projects tried to provide improved versions of
these datasets, e.g. NSL-KDD, or to build new datasets.
Despite this big number of efforts to contribute a definite
dataset for IDS evaluation and, after having learned many
lessons, we can see that there is still only partial solutions. In
a first review, we can check that many of the recent datasets
lack from either real traffic or updated attack strategies. The
most important limitation from the perspective of this paper
is related to the duration of the data recording. In order to
enable the evaluation of detection algorithms that consider the
cyclostationary evolution of traffic, i.e., differences in traffic
between daytime/night or weekdays/weekends, a long duration
trace is needed. As we will review, there are no publicly
existing datasets to evaluate these algorithms.
In this paper, our contribution is threefold. First, we make
a review of past efforts in the publication of datasets for
the evaluation of IDSs. From this review we extract a set of
requirements that datasets for IDS evaluation should comply
with. Second, we give arguments for using cyclostationarity
features in modern network traffic IDSs. Third, we describe a
new dataset (the UGR’16 dataset1) designed for the evaluation
of cyclostationarity-based network IDSs, that contains real
anonymized netflow traces captured in a tier-3 ISP for 4
months. In this dataset, we have included realistic attack
scenarios and labeled the traffic.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II we
review previous efforts to capture datasets for training and
testing IDSs. From this review, we derive a set of requirements
for this kind of datasets and compare the different proposals.
The need of using cyclostationarity in the network anomaly
detection process is presented in Section III, together with
a review of related works that leverage this feature. In Sec-
tion IV we describe how we have built the dataset and the
methodology followed to insert attack traffic. In Section V we
first make an analysis of the dataset, discussing and providing
a global description of the information contained on it. Then,
we also discuss the labeling process. Finally, we conclude in
1We take the name for the dataset from the acronym of University of
Granada.
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II. REVIEW OF EXISTING DATASETS
In what follows, we first review the most relevant efforts
done in this field during the last years. Then, from these
previous works, we derive the ideal requirements for an IDS
evaluation dataset. Finally, we compare all the suggested
approaches and discuss the main features of our proposal.
A. Existing Datasets
Since the apparition of IDS technologies, many different
efforts to publish good datasets for their evaluation have been
made. The first serious efforts to build datasets lead to those
that we call reference datasets, i.e., datasets that have been
used in many research papers and that have allowed the
research community to learn many lessons. After them, a large
list of more recent datasets have appeared.
It is important to clarify at this point that we will review
only those datasets that include labels indicating if attacks
are present or not. There are other non-labeled traffic datasets
that are extensively used for other purposes, e.g. CAIDA
datasets [4], but their application to the IDS evaluation field
is really limited.
1) Reference Datasets:
DARPA datasets. As previously indicated, the first effort to
build a dataset for IDS evaluation was carried out by the MIT
Lincoln Lab. These datasets are known as DARPA datasets [3]:
DARPA’98 and DARPA’99.
DARPA’98 consists of 4GB of compressed raw (binary)
tcpdump data, that spans 7 weeks of synthetic network traffic
with 5M of connection records. Test data comprises two weeks
of traffic and around 2M connection records. DARPA’99
comprises 5 weeks of tcpdump network traffic files sniffed
from two different points in a synthetic network (one inside
the network and the other outside). Host based audit data is
also collected from 4 victim systems.
KDDCup’99 dataset. This dataset [5] was prepared by
Stolfo et al. [6] for the KDD’99 contest. It is built from the
DARPA’98 dataset and it consists of 4,9M single connection
vectors, each with 41 features, labeled either as normal or
attack of one of the following categories: DoS, User to Root
(U2R), Remote to Local (R2L) and Probing Attack. There
are 24 training attack types, with an additional set of 14
different attacks that appear in the test data only. The features
extracted by Stolfo et al. were derived as several classes:
a) Basic features of TCP connections (e.g. duration, #bytes,
TCP flags, port number, etc.); b) traffic features, derived
from a two seconds sliding time window and considering
connections directed to the same host or the same service
(e.g. #connections to the same host as the current connection
in the past two seconds); c) content features, extracted from
the information in the payload, e.g. number of failed login
attempts.
Improvements to DARPA datasets. McHugh et al. [7]
made an extensive analysis on DARPA datasets, concluding
that traffic data had a lack of statistical evidence of similarity
to typical Air Force network traffic, low traffic rates, rela-
tive uniform distribution of the four major attack categories,
skewed distribution of victim hosts, and flat network topology.
Mahoney et al. [8] stated that DARPA’99 dataset presents
statistical problems, i.e., they detected the presence of artifacts
that could allow a network anomaly detection system to detect
some novel intrusions based on idiosyncrasies of the underly-
ing implementation of the simulation, with an artificially low
false alarm rate.
Motivated by these studies, Tavallaee et al. improved KDD-
Cup’99, creating the NSL-KDD dataset [9]. From the original
dataset, they eliminated a hugh number of redundant records
present in the original data, and they applied a methodology to
rise the difficulty level of records in the dataset. Other authors
also proposed additional extensions, as Perona et al. in [10],
where gureKDDCup dataset was built as an extension to KD-
DCup’99 in which payload-related information of connections
was processed from DARPA’98 and included in the dataset.
2) More recent datasets:
Although many of the current research in the IDS field still
use these cited reference datasets, due to the critics and the
inherent problems already pointed out, many other researchers
have built new updated datasets. The main motivations in these
datasets are either to provide different types of data, e.g. data
related to more updated threats like botnets, or to collect traffic
that is more realistic in current networks, under the hyphotesis
that traffic features in the current Internet have evolved since
the collection of DARPA datasets.
Some of the efforts to build datasets during the recent last
years are chronologically summarized in what follows.
Sperotto (2008). A flow based dataset (2008) was generated
by Sperotto et al. [11]. The dataset is composed of labeled non-
synthetic traffic. Its main limitation is that the amount of traffic
collected is reduced and the topology is very simplistic, mainly
due to the fact that, for performance reasons, they monitor a
single host (honeypot) connected to a university network. The
authors claim that the trace size is enough, but it is only 6 days
long, what does not allow to test algorithms based on daily
and weekly traffic evolution patterns. Labeling in this dataset
is done based on logs from the honeypot system, what makes
it dependable on the detection system configuration and the
log processing. The dataset is only available upon request by
mail to the authors.
MAWI Working Lab Dataset. This dataset [12] was con-
tributed since 2010 as a labeled version of the MAWI (Mea-
surement and Analysis on the WIDE Internet) archive sample
for network points B and F. The archive contains tcpdump
daily traces of 15 minutes captured in a link between Japan
and the United States. Although the archive contains traces
since 2001, only the traffic since 2007 is labeled. The labels
are generated by using a combination of several anomaly
detection classifiers. This dataset is really extensive and allows
the analysis for a very long period. The main limitation is that
the trace is obtained only during a 15 minutes period per day.
In addition, the labeling is dependent on the classifiers that
have been used in the process and their generation of false
positives.
3UNB ISCX 2012: This dataset was created by Shiravi
et al. [13]. The most relevant contribution of this work is
the use of profiles for the generation of traffic. The authors
define certain α profiles for attack traffic and β profiles
for background traffic. They implement their proposal in a
network with 17 Windows XP stations and a single Windows 7
computer, collecting data during 7 days. The main drawbacks
of this dataset nowadays are its reduced duration, the use of
somehow old operating systems (Windows XP), and the use
of synthetic traffic.
CTU-13. This dataset is described in [14]. It is composed
of 13 different malware captures in a real network envi-
ronment, including labeled botnet, normal and background
traffic, where background means that the authors are not really
able to decide if it is malicious or not. Regarding the kind
of information provided, flow traces are available in several
formats. For privacy reasons, pcap files are only offered when
no information about the network is present, e.g. a single
host with synthetic traffic. There are many different short-
duration captures that span from 2013 to 2016, although the
only dataset that is well documented [14] corresponds to 2013.
The main limitation is with the short duration of the traces,
that impedes building models that consider cyclostationary
evolution. Other limitation is with background traffic. The
authors say that it is obtained from a university router, but
no more details about topology or services are provided.
Regarding attack traffic, this dataset is focused on the behavior
of 13 botnet scenarios, where malware are located in Windows
XP machines. Despite these issues, this dataset is a really
good effort to capture real traffic, although its application is
narrowed to that of botnet behavior detection.
ADFA-LD12 (2013). This dataset was presented in [15].
Its focus is on host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS)
evaluation. Several attacks are striked against a Linux OS
machine (Ubuntu 11.04), e.g. password bruteforce against
FTP and SSH, client side attacks, java based payloads, php
RFI attacks, etc. In addition, modern hacking methodologies
are employed, including the use of attack frameworks like
Metasploit [16]. Traces are collected by using the auditd
Unix tool. The main problem with this dataset is related
with the trace associated to the normal behavior. Here, only
one computer (with Linux OS) is considered and there is no
description at all about the services and software installed.
This way, it is not possible to take it as a base to generalize
a common behavior of other machines in the Internet.
UNSW-NB15. This dataset was recently proposed by
Moustafa et al. [17]. The authors used an attack automatic
generation tool called IXIA PerfectStorm to implement nine
families of real and updated attacks against several servers.
They collected tcpdump traces of the network traffic, for a total
duration of 31 hours at the beginning of 2015 (2M of flows).
From these traces, a dataset of 49 features for every flow
was built. The main problem with this dataset is the synthetic
generation of traffic, which is associated to theoretical instead
of realistic behaviors in the Internet..
Application specific datasets. Finally, it is worth mentioning
the existence of different datasets that are specific for certain
areas. As an example, new datasets are being built for indus-
trial control systems (SCADA) [18] [19].
B. Requirements for IDS evaluation datasets
Some authors have analyzed previous datasets and identified
a set of desirable features [9] [11] [13] [20] for an ideal dataset
to evaluate IDSs. From these works and our own review of
existing datasets, we extract some requirements:
1) Features: Datasets can include network and/or host
features. Network features are normally summarized in
a per-flow basis, and include characteristics like flow
duration, timestamps, number of bytes and packets,
flags, IP addresses and port numbers, inter-packet mean
time, etc. Regarding host features, some examples used
in previous datasets are: number of failed login attempts
or flags to indicate certain conditions, like if a root
shell is obtained or if the attacker successfully logged
in. To train anomaly NIDS, network features are es-
sential, while host characteristics are normally used to
train anomaly HIDS. Some datasets include both set of
features, which allows the training of both types of IDS.
The selected dataset should contain appropriate features
for the type of IDS to be trained and tested. Anyway, it
is desirable that data are shared in raw format as they
are obtained from the network. This way, researchers
can use their own features at will.
2) Real background traffic: A dataset should contain real
traffic. This is especially critical with the background
traffic, due to the fact that a synthetic generation of
network traffic might lead to normality models and
behaviors that are not correct.
3) Updated attack traffic: Datasets for evaluating IDS
should contain realistic attack instances updated with
state-of-the-art attack techniques and tools.
4) Labeling: The different records in the dataset should
ideally be correctly labeled as malicious or not. In case
of attack records, the type of attack is also needed. As
we will discuss next, the labeling process presents many
difficulties [12].
5) Duration: Datasets should span for several cycles of
study (days or weeks), to make it possible to consider the
cyclostationary evolution of traffic in the daytime/night
period, and also during weekdays/weekends and even
for different months.
6) Documentation: A detailed description of the dataset is
needed to understand its limitations and potentialities.
Some of the published datasets fail to provide compre-
hensive enough information.
7) Format: Datasets usually include information in either
pcap (tcpdump), csv or flow (netflow) format. pcap for-
mat permits a more comprehensive evaluation of IDSs,
mainly due to the fact that payloads are included in the
information. In the csv format, on the other hand, there
is a preprocess of pcap information and an extraction of
relevant records for different features. Note that includ-
ing payload information usually implies a problem from
a privacy point of view, as it is complicated to reliably
anonymize the trace. For this reason, flow information,
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COMPARISON OF DATASETS FOR IDS EVALUATION
Dataset
Ref. Features
N:Net
H:Host
Real back
traffic
Updated
attack
traffic
Labeling Duration Docum. Format
P:pcap
F:flow
DARPA’98/’99 [3] N 7 7 3 3 3 P
KDDCup99 [5] N 7 7 3 3 3 csv
NSL-KDD’09 [9] N 7 7 3 3 3 csv
gureKDDCup’08 [10] N 7 7 3 3 3 csv
Sperotto’2008 [11] N (3) (3) 3 7 3 F
MAWILab’2010 [12] N 3 3 (3) (3) 3 P
UNB ISCX’2012 [13] N 7 3 3 7 3 csv
CTU-13 [14] N (3) 3 (3) (3) (3) P&F
ADFA-2013 [15] H (3) 3 3 7 3 csv
UNSW-NB15 [17] N 7 3 3 7 3 csv
UGR’16 N 3 3 (3) 3 3 F
e.g. netflow format, is sometimes preferred when dealing
with real traffic, while pcap/csv formats are provided in
simulated/synthetic traffic datasets. Finally, note that the
volume of data is directly associated with the format.
Hence, flow format seems more appropriate for datasets
with a long duration, as pcap format would generate a
huge data volume in this case.
C. Comparison of Existing Datasets
Table I contains a comparison of the different datasets
reviewed in Section II-A. Here, we analyze the different
requirements previously described and assess if the different
datasets comply with them. A sign 3 in the table means
that the requirement is succesfully met, while 7 stands for
the opposite. We use (3) to indicate that a requirement is
not completely met or that there are certain limitations. For
example, the real background traffic requirement in CTU-13
dataset is not completely met, as there are no details about the
services and topologies behind the router under monitoring.
From this comparison we can derive some conclusions.
First, there is a need to constantly update both background
and attack traffic and, thus, new datasets are periodically
demanded. Note that this problem was pointed out in [13].
Yet, the solution provided by their authors is based on building
traffic models, and there is no guarantee that real traffic
in a near future will follow these models. This means that
reference datasets, which have been really useful for many
years, are not valid anymore. Second, we can see that there
has been a big effort in deploying realistic attack data in
recent datasets, mainly by using powerful hacking frameworks
and standard tools. In contrast, insufficient efforts have been
made in the task of providing realistic background traffic.
The main limitation here is the problem of privacy. For this
reason, some datasets that monitor real traffic, e.g. CTU-13,
only provide flow information and hide payloads. Finally, a
main problem of recent datasets from the perspective of the
claims that we make in this paper is related to the duration
of the traces. If one pursues the evaluation of an IDS that
builds normality models considering the traffic evolution in
non-stationary periods (daytime/night, weekdays/weekends or
even for different months), the existing datasets only provide
a very limited information.
For the dataset we describe in this paper (UGR’16), we
especially care to collect both realistic background and attack
traffics. As it will explained, a modified approach of that
used in [14] is followed for labeling, just to keep the balance
between providing a complete labeling with synthetic traffic
and dealing with realistic traffic. The duration of the dataset is
enough to train models that consider non-stationary periods.
In order to keep privacy requirements, we provide data in
anonymized flow format.
III. CYCLOSTATIONARITY IN NETWORK IDSS
Network traffic presents short-term as well as long-term
temporal behaviors. This fact has been traditionally leveraged
for network design and performance evaluation aims [21],
[22]. We can see in Fig. 1 an example to clarify the usefulness
of considering cyclostationarity in the context of network
anomaly detection. Let us consider two different simple ap-
proaches based on the observation of the network volume
traffic as a random variable. In both, we define thresholds
(red dashed lines) so that if traffic volume is above or below
them an anomaly is signaled. The evolution of the variable
during a complete week for the stationary and cyclostationary
approaches is shown in Figs. 1a and 1b, respectively. On the
one hand, in the stationary approach, fixed threshold values are
computed from the statistical variation of the variable. On the
other hand, the cyclostationary approach considers threshold
values that vary over time. In the case of our example, we have
considered the mean value of the observed variable computed
for the same hour at all the days in the data set (pointed black
series in Fig. 1b), showing two different thresholds (upper
and lower thresholds) computed as a deviation from the mean
values at different hours.
Fig. 2 shows the ROC curves obtained for a detector with
either the stationary thresholds or the cyclostationary ones. We
can see that the performance is better when cyclostationarity
is considered (an improvement in Area Under Curve, AUC,
values is obtained). Although this is just an example and
perhaps in certain scenarios the results are not so good, we
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Fig. 1. Network traffic volume evolution for a single week. Thresholds (red dashed lines) and mean value (dotted black lines) are represented for (a) stationary
approach and (b) cyclostationary approach.
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Fig. 2. ROC curves for the stationary and cyclostationary threshold-based
anomaly detectors.
can still say that considering cyclostationarity would be worth
in many cases.
Despite all of this, we can only mention few works that have
used this feature for anomaly detection purposes in the security
context [23], [24], [25]. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no
publicly available and well described traffic data sets exist at
present where temporal cyclostationarity is captured. To cite
two examples, authors in [22] use a trace of mobile users
traffic for a single week and apply markov models to capture
the volume dynamics. In a more recent work [24], the data
set used is a 6 weeks duration traffic trace obtained from a
campus university. As in the previous case, it is not publicly
available.
IV. DATASET GENERATION METHODOLOGY
Here, we describe the methodology followed to produce the
dataset. In addition, we provide an extensive description of all
the relevant details to use it for IDS evaluation purposes.
The main lines of the design rationale to build the dataset
are these. The trace is split in two captures: calibration and
test. The calibration capture is designed to allow the training of
normality models. In this capture we consider only background
network traffic, which should be as real as possible, as we will
see in what follows. In addition, an essential requirement is
that this capture has a long duration, so that it allows the
training of algorithms that consider cyclostationarity.
The test capture, on the other hand, combines both back-
ground and controlled attack traffic. Attacks are generated by
using state of the art hacking tools and they are representative
of actual attacks. The main purpose of this capture is to
evaluate if an IDS is able or not to detect the attacks. In
order to allow the testing of anomaly detection algorithms
that consider cyclostationarity, we define a standard batch of
attacks, and it is executed at different hours and different days,
so that researchers can test if the accuracy of their detectors
depends on the time or the day.
A. Network infrastructure
The data is obtained from a real network of a Tier 3 ISP.
The ISP is a cloud service provider, so that many of the
services implemented in the network are virtualized. We find
typical hosting services, like web with proprietary or standard
configurations, e.g. Joomla or Wordpress, email, FTP and DNS
servers, etc. This network is used by many client companies
that have disparate sizes and are focused on a wide variety of
markets. This implies that the traffic traversing the network is
expected to be very heterogeneous, as it includes both clients’
accesses to the Internet, and the reception of traffic by typical
servers. Thus, one potential advantage of this trace over other
datasets is its representativeness of a very wide subset of
Internet users. As shown before, many other traces only collect
traffic from university or research center setups, where only
specific traffic patterns are present.
The schematic infrastructure of the ISP network and the
setup for the collection of data are shown in Fig. 3. The main
aspects are:
• Two redundant border routers, BR1 and BR2, provide
access to the Internet. On each of their outgoing network
interfaces, a netflow probe is configured, allowing the
collection of all incoming and outgoing connections. Note
that, for privacy and volume reasons, we will not provide
payload information, so netflow information is recorded
instead of pcap (tcpdump) files.
6Fig. 3. Topology of the network.
• The ISP has two different subnetworks. One is termed
core network, where the services that are not protected
by firewall are located. The second is the inner network,
where firewall services are being provided to the clients.
• An attackers’ network with 5 attacker machines is de-
ployed at the top level. They are referred to as A1-A5.
• In the core network, we configure 5 victim machines
that are used only for the dataset collection. They are
colocated with other real clients in an existent network
that we call victim network V1. These machines are
named as V11-V15.
• Regarding the inner network, a total of 15 additional
victim machines are placed in three different existing net-
works, each with 5 machines. We name these networks as:
victim network V2 (machines V21-V25), victim network
V3 (machines V31-V35), and victim network V4 (machines
V41-V45).
B. Attack traffic generation
Some previous datasets, like MAWILab [12] or CAIDA [4],
consider only real traffic captured in certain network probes.
While this is an obvious advantage for modeling background
traffic, it implies certain limitations for the identification of
attacks. In fact, labeling real traffic implies the need to confirm
that connections signaled as attacks are really malicious traffic.
For this reason, we decide to combine real background traffic
(probably containing attack instances) with attacks that are
intentionally generated for the experiment.
For this purpose, the mentioned 25 virtual machines are set
up with a similar configuration to those provisioned for the
ISP clients, i.e., they implement web, DNS, FTP and email
servers. The virtual machines A1 to A5 are used to launch
a number of specific attacks over time against the rest (Vx1-
Vx5 with x = {1− 4}), which play the role of victims of the
attacks. As it can be seen in Fig. 3, both attackers and victims
are inside the ISP infrastructure to avoid the potential detection
and blocking of the attacks by other intermediate ISPs. Yet,
the attackers’ network is located in the border router just to
generate attack traffic as if it was coming from the Internet.
Implementation of attacks. Due to the fact that only
netflow traffic is being collected and, thus, payloads are not
considered in the trace, we do not include attack types that
are detectable through payload analysis. For this reason, we
only consider network-related attacks. The types of attacks
implemented are:
• Low-rate DoS: TCP SYN packets are sent to the victims
using the hping3 tool. The destination port is 80, so
that the traffic is mixed with real background web traffic.
The size of every packet is 1280 bits and the rate is 100
packets/s. As it can be seen, the rate of the attack is
low, so that we do not affect the normal operation of the
network. Three different attack scenarios are considered
and repeated over time:
– DoS11: One-to-one DoS attack, where the attacker
A1 attacks the victim V21. The total duration of
DoS11 is 3 minutes.
– DoS53s: The five attackers A1-A5 attack three of
the victims, each one at a different network, for
3 minutes. In particular, these attacks follow this
structure: (A1, A2) → V21, (A3, A4) → V31 and A5
→ V41. The letter ‘s’ at the end of the name of the
attack stands for ‘synchronous’, which means that
the attacks are initiated by the attackers at the same
time. Because of that synchronization, the duration
of DoS53s is 3 minutes too.
– DoS53a: The attacks are executed as in DoS53s,
but now every victim is sequentially selected, being
attacked for 3 minutes, with an inactivity period of
30 seconds between the three attacks. This way, the
total duration of DoS53a is 10 minutes. In this case
the letter ‘a’ at the end of the name of the attack
stands for ‘asynchronous’.
• Port scanning: A continuous SYN scanning to common
ports of victims is executed for 3 minutes, using the nmap
tool. Two variants are implemented for this attack:
– Scan11: One-to-one scan attack, where the attacker
A1 scans the victim V41.
– Scan44: Four-to-four scan attack, where the attackers
A1, A2, A3 and A4 initiate a scan at the same time
to the victims V21, V11, V31 and V41, respectively.
As the attacks are carried out in parallel (beginning
at the same instant), the total duration is 3 minutes.
• Botnet traffic: Due to the prominence of botnets nowa-
days, we have designed a methodology to insert botnet
traffic in the trace. A main problem appears from the
ethical point of view, as it is not feasible to infect
machines in such an open network while ensuring a
complete control over the potential damage that botnet
malware could cause. For this reason, we suggest mix-
ing botnet captures recorded elsewhere in a controlled
environment with our background traffic. We are aware
that this mixture has a main limitation: the resulting trace
might not be completely realistic in certain cases, as it
7does not consider the effect of botnet traffic over others.
As an example, think of a period of time where a DDoS
is executed against a victim. During this time, and due
to the existence of overwhelmed network devices, the
normal background traffic would also be affected and
would not remain the same. In this scenario, mixing a
capture of DDoS with normal background traffic would
be unrealistic. Still, we think that the proposed solution
(mixture of traffic captures) will be a good solution in
many situations where the influence of botnet traffic on
the background traffic is negligible.
As a proof of concept, we have included in our trace
botnet traffic obtained from the execution of the mal-
ware known as Neris. This capture is available as the
CTU-Malware-Capture-Botnet-42 [26]. In this malware
version, infected bots send SPAM, connect to an HTTP
C&C server and use HTTP to perform some ClickFraud
(see details in [26]).
In order to insert the botnet trace into our dataset, we
follow this methodology. First, we convert the pcap
file containing the trace to nfcapd format using the
softflowd tool to generate the netflow traffic and
nfcapd tool to collect information into nfcapd files.
Then, we modify the nfcapd file to adapt the times-
tamps and IP addresses to be coherent with our dataset.
Specifically, we inject the traffic in the dataset as if all the
twenty victim machines in our setup are infected, so that
algorithms can check if the correlation of traffic coming
from all these bots is detected. The complete Neris botnet
trace is then cut off so that the duration is one hour during
the infection phase. This will allow us to generate attack
batches to test the behavior of IDSs with background
traffic at different times of the day/week, as explained in
what follows.
Attacks execution scheduling. The attack traffic is gen-
erated in batches of 2 hours. In every attack batch, all the
attack variants are executed following two possible scheduling
patterns:
1) Planned scheduling: Each attack in the batch is executed
at a fixed and known instant given by an offset from an
initial batch time t0. The offsets for the different attacks
are shown in Table II. Note that there is no overlapping
in time among the different types of attacks.
2) Random scheduling: The initial time for the execution
of each of the attacks is randomly selected between
t0+00h00m and t0+01h50m, thus restricting the total
duration of the batch to a maximum of 2 hours. In this
case, there could exist time overlap among attacks and
this will let us check the accuracy of anomaly detectors
when this situation appears. For the random batches,
botnet traffic is not combined in the dataset.
It is worth noting that the attacks are launched while real
background traffic is traversing the network. This way, the
traffic captured by the sensors for the corresponding monitor-
ing window will include both normal and attack related traffic
instances. Thus, in order to assess the potential detection of
attacks by IDSs when they are mixed with background traffic
TABLE II
PLANNED SCHEDULING FOR EACH OF THE ATTACKS WITHIN A TIME
INTERVAL OF 2H STARTING AT t0 .
Starting time Attack Duration
t0 + 0h00m DoS11 3m
t0 + 0h10m DoS53s 3m
t0 + 0h20m DoS53a 10m
t0 + 0h40m Scan11 3m
t0 + 0h50m Scan44 3m
t0 + 1h00m Botnet 1h
TABLE III
DATE AND TIME FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE DIFFERENT ATTACK
BATCHES IN THE DATASET.
Date Planned Random
Thu, 07/28/2016 00:00 12:00
Fri, 07/29/2016 02:00 14:00
Sat, 07/30/2016 04:00 16:00
Sun, 07/31/2016 06:00 18:00
Mon, 08/01/2016 08:00 20:00
Tue, 08/02/2016 10:00 22:00
Wed, 08/03/2016 12:00 N/A
Thu, 08/04/2016 14:00 00:00
Fri, 08/05/2016 16:00 02:00
Sat, 08/06/2016 18:00 04:00
Sun, 08/07/2016 20:00 06:00
Mon, 08/08/2016 22:00 08:00
Tue, 08/09/2016 N/A 10:00
at different hours of day, we launch attack batches during 12
consecutive days from the beginning of the attack experiment,
thus covering all possible day hours. For a day in the attack
experiment, a planned scheduling batch is launched at time t0,
followed by a random scheduling batch that starts at t0+12h.
In every next day during 12 days, t0 is incremented by an
offset of 2h. In Table III we can see the different times and
dates selected for the execution of planned and random attack
batches.
C. Dataset Captures
The flows are captured and transferred using Netflow v9
format from the indicated sensors in the network (see Fig. 3).
Default parameters are maintained for the Cisco netflow con-
figuration of the routers, i.e., inactive timer is 15 seconds,
while active timer for flows is 30 minutes.
The complete dataset contains two different captures: a cal-
ibration set and a test set. The calibration set lasts 100 days,
and ranges from 10:47-03/18/2016 until 18:27-06/26/2016. Its
primary purpose is to assist in building and calibrating nor-
mality models, mainly because no attacks were synthetically
generated. Note that this does not imply that no attacks are
present, as we will discuss in what follows.
Although the recording of the calibration set was auto-
matically programmed to be continuous over time, it was
interrupted twice by the ISP to carry out specific network
maintenance procedures. The two gaps are:
1) [02:00 03/27/2016 — 03:00 03/27/2016]
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FEATURES OF THE CALIBRATION AND THE TEST SETS.
Feature Calibration Test
Capture start 10:47h 03/18/2016 13:38h 07/27/2016
Capture end 18:27h 06/26/2016 09:27h 08/29/2016
Attacks start N/A 00:00h 07/28/2016
Attacks end N/A 12:00h 08/09/2016
Number of files 17 6
Size (compressed) 181GB 55GB
# Connections ≈ 13,000M ≈ 3,900M
2) [00:00 04/01/2016 — 17:20 04/06/2016]
The test set approximately lasts one month, from 13:38-
07/27/2016 to 09:27-08/29/2016. During this capture, the
attacks batches are executed starting at 00:00-07/28/2016,
finishing at 12:00-08/09/2016, as it is shown in Table III. This
capture is intended to be used for the validation of detection
algorithms.
Table IV summarizes different features for both the calibra-
tion and the test sets. We can see the dates for the two captures
and the number and size of the files included in each one. In
addition, the number of connections included in the two sets
is shown. This number is much higher than in datasets from
other authors.
D. Dataset Preprocessing and Availability
The collected nfcapd binary format files for both the
calibration and the test sets are grouped in a single file per
week for the two capture periods. The average size of the
different files is around 14GB in compressed tar format. In
the calibration set we have 17 files, while 6 files are available
for the test set. All these files are available for downloading
from our website: http://nesg.ugr.es/nesg-ugr16.
We share the netflow information in both nfcapd format
and a preprocessed csv format obtained by using the nfdump
tool. The nfcapd format contains all the netflow features,
so that all of them could be consider by any IDS. For the
csv format we have selected the most common features used
in previous datasets2: timestamp of the end of a flow (te),
duration of flow (td), source IP address (sa), destination IP
(da), source port (sp), destination port (dp), protocol (pr), flags
(flg), forwarding status (fwd), type of service (stos), packets
exchanged in the flow (pkt), and their corresponding number
of bytes (byt).
The IP addresses of the different machines in the dataset
have been anonymized by using the CryptoPan prefix-
preserving anonymization [27], implemented in the nfanon
tool [28]. This tool has been traditionally used for the
anonymization of the traces in the CAIDA datasets. The
correspondence of the anonymized IP addresses in the different
victim and attacker networks are shown in Table V.
2We indicate with parentheses the name of the variables as termed by the
nfdump tool to ease the identification in the dataset.
TABLE V
CORRESPONDENCE OF ANONYMIZED IP ADDRESS WITH MACHINES IN
THE EXPERIMENTAL SETUP.
Machine/s IP Address/es
A1 - A5 42.219.150.{246,247,243,242,241}
V11 - V15 42.219.156.{30,31,29,28,27}
V21 - V25 42.219.158.{16,17,18,19,21}
V31 - V35 42.219.152.{20,21,22,23,18}
V41 - V45 42.219.154.{69,68,70,71,66}
V. DATASET ANALYSIS AND LABELING
Now we first analyze the data collected in our two captures
of the dataset, calibration and test, in order to give some in-
sights and numbers that would help to assess its usefulness for
IDS evaluation. Then, we also describe the labeling process,
indicating the procedures followed and their limitations.
A. Dataset figures
As shown in Table IV, the total number of flows in the
dataset is above 16,900M, and the duration of the trace is
longer than 4 months. This allows the evaluation of detec-
tion algorithms that leverage the cyclostationary evolution of
traffic in different daytime/night patterns, as well as week-
day/weekend phases. In addition, the number of external IPs
observed in the trace is higher than 600M, corresponding to
around 10M different (sub)networks.
In Fig. 4 we can see the evolution of the number of flows
(in million of flows) for both the calibration and the test
sets. Vertical dashed lines separate the different weeks (and
thus files) in the dataset. The protocols with the greatest
amount of flows are differentiated. The red dots in the X-
axis represent the anomalies found by three state-of-the-art
anomaly detectors, where the size of the circle is related to
the number of anomalies in the interval (see the discussion of
this point in Section V-B).
There are some interesting insights from these results:
• We confirm that, as expected, HTTP/S protocol is pre-
dominant and the associated DNS traffic follows a coher-
ent pattern.
• Due to the fact that most of the clients are companies
that allocate their servers in the network, the traffic from
BitTorrent or other P2P services is almost residual.
• Note that there is an increase in SSH traffic in the interval
04/10/16 – 04/21/16. As we will show in Section V-B,
this corresponds to SSH scan attacks.
• Surprisingly, considering its insecure nature, we observe
that many companies still use the Telnet service to
manage their equipments (see Fig. 4(b)).
• There are peaks in the SMTP traffic spread out over
time in the two sets. These peaks are sometimes email
campaigns coming from legitimate companies (banks,
online services, etc.), but we have also found spam
campaigns (see Section V-B for more details).
• Note the constant pattern for SMB traffic. This traffic
corresponds to a single retailing company with many
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the number of flows for (a) calibration set and (b) test set for intervals of one hour. The red circles in X-axis represent the anomalies
found in background traffic by three state-of-the-art anomaly detectors, where the size of the circle is related to the number of anomalies in the interval.
shops. Every establishment communicate with a central
server periodically to check the status of some service
or data. The peaks in the SMB traffic are due to the
unsubscription of certain shops to that service.
B. Labeling
Labeling is a critical issue in the production of datasets
for IDSs evaluation. When dealing with real traffic, it is a
real challenge to decide whether a given flow corresponds to
an attack or not. Even when experts are manually assessing
the nature of a flow there are certain cases in which this is
not clear. For this reason, as discussed in Section II, many
authors decide to generate only synthetic traffic, as only in
these environments we are able to certainly determine which
flows are due to an attack and which are legitimate. The
problem with this approach is that background traffic is not
representative of real networks behavior, thus opening the
possibility to IDS algorithms being biased towards detecting
fake scenarios.
In our case, as previously discussed, we have opted for using
synthetic attack traffic interlaced with real background traffic.
This fact poses a problem when trying to label the dataset.
Background traffic is not clean from attacks that could be
executed during the recording of the dataset and, as said, it
is not clear how to identify them in many cases. This is not
the case of our synthetic traffic. Obviously, we are able to
label these flows as we know the rules to identify them (IP
addresses and ports, timestamps, etc.).
Some authors [14] that use the same approach as ours
decided to label flows or packets by using three different
tags: a) an attack label for the flows that they positively know
that correspond to an attack, b) a normal label for those that
are generated synthetically with normal patterns, and c) a
background label for those which no one knows exactly if
they are attacks or not. In our case, we are not synthetically
generating normal traffic, so that we label as background those
traffic flows that are not proven to be attacks (according to the
criteria given in what follows).
Labels are applied in a per-flow basis. It is worth to indicate
that connections are two-way, so that a single connection
appears as two different one-way connections. In order to
identify the attacks within the background traffic our strategy
is to perform both signature and anomaly detection on the
dataset.
Signature-based labeling. First, when possible, we iden-
tify attacks by their known signatures, providing labels for the
different attacks. This is the case of the attacks that we gener-
ate synthetically, since their signatures are known, as described
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TABLE VI
SUMMARY OF THE PUBLIC BLACKLISTS USED FOR SIGNATURE
IDENTIFICATION OF ATTACK FLOWS IN THE TRACE.
Blacklist Target Source
hpHosts Malware, Fraud, Ad tracking [29]
Malware DL Malware [30]
Spamhaus SPAM [31]
Abuse.ch Ransomware, Malware, C&C [32]
in Section IV-B. Note that not all the attacks implemented (see
Section III.B) have been individually labeled. Instead, some of
them have been grouped, due to the fact that their signatures
are actually the same, e.g., DoS11, Dos53s and DoS53a are
all labeled as “dos”.
In addition, we have selected the IP addresses in the dataset
that were published in the public blacklists indicated in Ta-
ble VI during the period of time that ranges from two months
before the capture until two months after. The total amount of
IP addresses in the dataset identified in the blacklist is 10.175,
including only one of the IP addresses in the ISP range. Note
that although the flows involving IPs in the blacklists are
labeled, when working with the dataset we should be aware
that not all of them are necessarily attacks.
Anomaly-based labeling. Second, we have performed
anomaly detection to identify other possible attacks in the
background traffic.
We have evaluated the dataset by using three different
state-of-the-art anomaly detectors. The first pair of detec-
tors, MSNMC and MSNMS are proposed in the PCA-based
multivariate statistical network monitoring methodology [33].
MSNMC uses a mean centering approach for the features,
while MSNMS autoscales them before applying results. They
exhibit slightly different performance depending on the con-
sidered type of attacks [33]. These detectors have proven to
get an improved behavior in several different scenarios [34].
The third anomaly detector is the one-class support vector
machine (OCSVM) [35] [36]. The OCSVM is a classification-
based network anomaly detection method [37] reported to
provide excellent results.
We have focused on the most relevant anomalies where the
three detectors reach a consensus, and a manual analysis has
been performed to extract a signature from them. Following
this procedure, we have identified three relevant attacks:
• UDP Scan attack. The anomaly takes place in the short
interval from 04:10-08/01/16 to 04:14-08/01/16. Here,
we find an increase of ACK packets and very short
connections using UDP. Inspecting the Netflow records
for the time period we find a single IP from Germany
creating 867,405 connections from only four origin ports
(5061, 5062, 5066 and 5068). The destinations are 4,097
different hosts distributed in 16 different subnets (/24
mask). Depending on the source port of the connection,
each victim host is scanned through a specific range of
60 ports (e.g. from source port 5068, ports 5000-5059
were scanned). Due to this pattern of connections, we
conclude that it seems to be a malware driven scanning
for a specific vulnerability. Thus, we label as “anomaly-
udpscan” all these flows.
Let us illustrate our manual analysis for this anomaly
as an example. Our intention is only to motivate other
researchers for the identification of these anomalies by
using their own methods and detection algorithms. We
have used an ad hoc visual analytics tools aimed at de-
scribing, exploring and analyzing data in order to discover
underlying knowledge from data [38]. In addition, we
have counted with the help of the ISP staff.
In Figs. 5 to 7 we can see the evolution of the traffic
for this anomaly using a multiple linked view approach,
consisting of a timeline bar chart and an enhanced hive
plot [39]. Fig. 5 shows the temporal evolution of the
number of UDP connections during the anomaly period.
We see that there are 5 different bursts of traffic from
the German IP address to the ISP victims of the scan.
We can visualize this evolution using animated hive plots,
thus discovering patterns that, in turn, can be inspected in
detail. This tool allows us to visualize a simulation of the
recorded traffic in such a way that the visual identification
of anomalies can easily be discovered in a preattentive
way [40].
In Fig. 6 we see a snapshot of this tool for a set of
connections. In the figure, the different IPs observed in
the connections are represented as points in the axes,
such that the size of the point depends on the number
of connections in which that IP is involved. In our case,
we have split the representation in 3 different axes, where
we have selected the most active IPs in the ISP range (x-
axis), other IPs in Spain3 (y-axis) and the rest of the world
IPs (z-axis). The lines connecting IPs from different or
same axes represent the connections. The color of lines
indicates the source port of the connections.
Fig. 6 illustrates the visual pattern conveyed by the tool
for the normal behavior period during the anomaly (see
this period in Fig. 5). We check that the connections
observed here have a pattern that is very widespread
among the different IPs. The variety of colors in the
lines also show that there are no common patterns for
the source port. As a contrast, we represent in Fig. 7
the snapshots of the tool for the second and fifth burst
in the anomaly, where 30,662 and 35,303 connections in
just a second were made respectively (see Fig. 5). In the
figure, we can clearly identify a pattern related to the fact
that abnormal traffic is being generated. First, a single IP
is generating most of the connections. Second, in every
burst we see that the same source port is used. This
is identified by the colors (pink and grey, respectively)
of the different connections, indicating that almost all
connections in that burst have the same port as origin.
• SSH Scan attack. As we can see in Fig. 4(a), there is
an increase in SSH traffic in the interval 04/10/16 –
04/21/16. We have manually checked that this increment
in the traffic is generated by an SSH scan attack coming
from a single machine hosted in the ISP (anonymized
3Where the ISP belongs to.
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42.219.156.231). The victims of the attack have a wide
range of IPs located in a South American country. In
addition, this machine is also generating an unusually
high load of scanning connections to other services like
DNS, HTTP and others. For this reason, we label the
connections involving this IP as “anomaly-sshscan”
• SPAM attack. We identify peaks of SMTP traffic in the
background traffic in both normal and attack sets (see red
dots in Fig. 4). This traffic is generated from 5 public IPs
(anonymized 42.219.156.212-215 and 42.219.156.223)
and sent to Yahoo email servers. A close observation of
this traffic leads to conclude that it follows the pattern
of a spam campaign. As an example, in the period
20:39-08/06/16 – 05:59-08/07/16 we find around 12.5M
of SMTP connections. Each machine generated around
2.5M e-mails. The ISP IT team confirmed that this was
a client that hired virtual machines during 2 months. The
hired IPs finished in the Yahoo blacklists, and that is
probably the reason why the client stopped hiring the
virtual machines. Thus, we label as “anomaly-spam” all
the connections to the SMTP port generated by these 5
IPs in the whole dataset.
We split attack labels in different sublabels, depending
on the type of attack being executed. Table VII shows the
correspondence between the labels we have used in the dataset
with the type of attack.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the main contribution is a new dataset for the
evaluation of IDS algorithms and systems called UGR’16. The
dataset has been designed to allow the training of anomaly
detection algorithms that consider the cyclostationary nature
of traffic data. UGR’16 is a collection of netflow traces for
more than 4 months of traffic in a real network from a tier-3
ISP, together with a set of realistic networking attacks that we
have specifically designed to train and test IDS algorithms.
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TABLE VII
CORRESPONDENCE AND CLASSES OF THE LABELS TO THE ATTACKS
FOUND IN THE TRACE.
Type of attack class Label
DoS11 signature (synthetic) dos
DoS53s signature (synthetic) dos
DoS53a signature (synthetic) dos
Scan11 signature (synthetic) scan11
Scan44 signature (synthetic) scan44
Botnet signature (synthetic) nerisbotnet
IP in blacklist signature blacklist
UDP Scan anomaly anomaly-udpscan
SSH Scan anomaly anomaly-sshscan
SPAM anomaly anomaly-spam
In addition to the comprehensive description and analysis of
the dataset, we have made an extensive review and comparison
of existing datasets, pointing out the main strengths and
weaknesses of the different approaches. From this study, a set
of requirements to be met by modern IDS evaluation datasets
have been extracted.
In addition to the fact that the duration of the dataset makes
it adequate to test algorithms that consider the cyclostationary
evolution of traffic in daytime/night and weekdays/weekends,
the main advantage of this dataset over others is that the
background traffic is very representative of the Internet traf-
fic, as it is captured from sensors in a ISP network where
many different profiles of clients are located. This is a main
difference with other datasets in which very specific traffic is
collected (e.g. traffic from a university or a research center).
Finally, the dataset is publicly available at the authors’
research group website.
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